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INTRODUCTION 
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1. In this paper a few personal comments on the present state of the 
Ethiopian Economy are presented on the basis of discussions held during a stay in 
Addis Ababa (from Nov 19 to Dec 1, 1991). The list of the gentlemen I met is 
given in annex 1. I want to express my gratitude to all of these gentlemen. To fix 
my appointments I benefitted from M. J-C. Boidin's help. He also gave me the 
opportunity to meet my collegues from the World Bank on mission to Addis 
Ababa. I want to thank this gentleman who is the EEC's Economic adviser for all 
the things done to me. Comments are also the fruit of the "Conference on the state 
of the Ethiopian Economy'' organised by the A.A. University (from Nov 22 to 26 
at Nazareth) to which I attended. Abstracts are shown in annex 2. In this respect I 
want to think pf. Taye Mengistae, chairman, Dept. of Economics who gave me the 
opportunity to meet some of the best economists of the country who were 
challenging various problems "Under the Ethiopian skies'' (to quote a well known 
book). One of the aims of the conference was to issue a detailed analysis of the 
growth facets in Ethiopia from 1974 to 90 i.e. under the late political regime (also 
referred to as the DERG one in the rest of this paper). It was also to compare the 
macro performances of that period to the pre-1974 ones. As such an attempt to 
appreciate the costs and gains of the command economy was made. This led to 
policy recommendations as how to improve growth in Ethiopia in the near future. 
So, the conference revealed a capacity of economic expertise from outside the 
government's circle, a concern strongly emphasized by the World Bank. For 
DIAL's staff members the conference issued' documents permitted a better 
understanding of the Ethiopian long run major trends (1968-91) presented in one 
of DIAL's working paper (1). And as such a better deal (it is hoped) with the 
question adressed to DIAL by the E.E.C. : "How to pass from a war to a peace 
economy" ? 
~ 
I - BAD WHICH MIGHT GET WORSE 
2. Ethiopia is embarked upon a process of transition to peace and 
market-based economy. That covers not only economic processes but maybe 
more fundamentaly institutional ones to secure and strenghen peace. The 
preceding indicates that within a period of 2 years i.e. till the free elections the 
government will have to work on two fronts : the institutional and economic ones. 
1 A view on Ethiopia or the Ethiopian verses by M-P. Verlaeten, DIAL., june 1991, 39p. 
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Therefore, it may be likely to assume it will not be able to work symetrically on 
both fronts, Given the needs to strenghen peace government could not have 
enough time to very much look at the economy during the transition period. 
More precisely, it would not have enough time to decide for political 
committments for the announced reforms to be implemented. Then, E.E.C. 
as the international community have to stay aware that not much 
improvement of the economic situation, social needs, and so on and so forth 
has to be expected during the transition period. In this respect, it is worth 
indicating that emergency help is needed for about 9m people according to UN's 
reckoning (6.5m of people in districts where drought has again killed the crops, 
the rest mostly victims of the late civil war). They need food at once, and transport 
to shift it. Sending lorries is not enough. The ports need refitting ; roads and 
bridges must be rebuilt. If the people are to plant for the next harvest, they must 
have seeds and water-tanks and medical care. Their survival depends on speedy 
charity because public bodies such as the producers' co-operatives and 
Agricultural Marketing Corporations aiming also at dealing with such issues have 
been dismantled or abolished. This was a follow-up of the March 5, 1990 
announced and implemented reforms (2). 
II - THE NEED FOR APPLIED REFORMS 
3. The government which has "overthrown" the DERG regime is aware of 
the need to apply economic reforms (but not only) such as to rehabilitate and 
reconstruct a devastated economy and lay down the foundation for long-term 
development. But it is a consensus government of which global popular support is 
not very strong and not homogenously distributed all over the country. Therefore, 
it seems to aim first of all at increasing its popular basis everywhere by acting 
along lines of ethnicity, faith and langage. So, risks of disintegrated ethiopian 
identity increase. Indeed, although remaining an open question there seems really 
to exist an ethiopian identify. Risks express through the Eritrean question i.e. the 
expected cession of Eritrea but not only. Within a very short period of time they 
could also express through an Oromo question, or the creation of a muslim land 
where amharic (3) would not be the used langage and an Ogaden on related to 
Somali's interests. These Ethiopian evolutions accounted for with these of Sudan 
and Somalia (i.e. increased unstability) might increase the unstability in the all 
2 The abolition of theproducers'co-operatives was accepted ifthis was the democratic will of the members. 
3 It is the langage spoken by about 7Oper cent of the Ethiopian people. 
The Agricultural Marketing Corporations were abolished. 
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Hom of Africa. That could even affect Djibouti. Indeed, the new Eritrean 
authorities could create an Haffarland along their coasts to strenghen their political 
basis. That could create increased pressure on Djibouti's government. All these 
evolutions are very relevant for the E.E.C. and the international community. 
Indeed, 8.8m people are at risk of famine in Sudan, 4.5m people in Somalia, 
100,000 people in Djibouti and 60,000 people over the border in Kenya. These 
amounts have to be added to the Ethiopian figure (9m). 
III - THE ECONOMIC POLICY OF ETHIOPIA FOR THE TRANSITION 
PERIOD 
A) Preliminary remark 
4. The new government has shown its will to undertake economic reforms 
by issuing documents related to the economic policy of Ethiopia for the transition 
period. The new orientations are detailed into two documents, one dating from 
august 1991 intitled The Economic Policy of Ethiopia for the Transition Period 
(EPTP) (A draft submitted for discussion) by TAMRAT LAYNE (Prime 
Minister) and a most recent one appearing mid-november. The second one has 
not yet been translated into english. The amharic version is thus the only available 
one. Further, it has not already been approved. The second document includes 
results of discussion of the EPTP in the framework of a wide bargaining process. 
During the Conference on the State of the Ethiopian Economic (to which I 
attended at Nazareth from Nov 22 to 26) Sketchs of the EPTP presented in the 
document dated from mid-november have been given to the audience. I shall refer 
to the speaker's presentation and two interviews given to me by the Vice-Minister 
for Planning to present the guide lines of the intended new economic policy. The 
basis differences between the transition economic policy and March 5, 1990 
announced reforms (shown in annex 3) are the foilowing : 
(i) the EPTP clearly indicates that the State will have a limited role in the 
economy as an direct investor, owner and monitor at the opposite of its regulating, 
managerial and supervisoring functions ; *+ 
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(ii) the EPTP tends to articulate the growth facets ; 
(iii) the EPTP tends to give rise to increased popular participation ; 
(iv) the EPTP benefits from peace as a chance for implementation ; 
(v) the EPTP no more refers to socialism as the basis direction of the country's 
development. 
B) Background (41 
5. The guide lines are introduced by a short but pertinent analysis of the 
state of the Ethiopian economy. The analysis is quiet convergent with that 
proposed during the Addis Ababa University Conference on the State of the 
Ethiopian Economy. I shall not come back in details on the analysis given DIAL'S 
staff produced two background papers which fit rather closely to the depicted 
situation. Nevertheless one has to keep in mind that the Ethiopian economy may 
be featured as follows : it has become a shortage economy. Indeed, at long run 
(1974-90) the agriculture output could not supply enough food and goods, 
the industry one could not supply enough goods and the services one could 
not supply enough services. Even if shortage increased at the end of the 80s 
because of the civil war, it is not only the result of that war. More fundamentally, 
it is due to a sample of facts. A combination of war, policy distortions, 
environmental degradation, an unfavorable demographic dynamics, adverse 
external factors and a host of structural problems has been responsible for the 
disappointing performance of the economy over the long run. As a result 
between 1974 and 1990 per capita income declined by about 0.8% per annum 
revealing declining living standard of a population already wallowing in 
extreme poverty. 
6 .  The dismal record of the Ethiopian Economy was essentially due to the 
disappointing performance of the commodity producing sectors (i.e. agriculture 
plus industry : 1.2% per annum on average) especially agriculture, which grew by 
merely 0.7% or 2% below the rate of growth of population. The performance of 
the industrial sector was more respectable (2.5%) but only within limits imposed 
by a stagnating agriculture. The services performed better (3.5%) but largely on 
4 I benefitted from notes written by teachers from A.A. U.  to write this paragraph. 
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account of rising military expenditures and a vastly expanded goverment 
bureaucracy (public administration and defense : 5.7%). As a global outcome 
saving deteriorated strongly. On account of a steadily declining saving rate and 
generally rising tendency of investment (mainly due to war), the country's 
resource balance has been declining, reaching (-) 10% of GDP during 1988-90. 
This has meant increasing reliance on external resources to finance the country's 
limited investment effort, which is one of the lowest in the world. Consequently, 
Ethiopia's debt position has been deteriorating at an alarming rate. In 1990-91, for 
example, debt service payments represented almost 99% of the value of 
merchandise exports. 
7. A corollary of the widening resource gap has been a large and steadily 
widening budget deficit, triggered to a large extent by mounting military 
expenditure and spending on the govemment bureaucracy. Almost two-thirds of 
this deficit was financed by external sources, the rest being covered by borrowing 
from the banking system. This has meant a dramatic expansion in money supply, 
with obvious inflationary consequences. The state of the balance of payments was 
also unhealthy, and the import cover of the country by the end of the 1980s was 
less than ten days. Not surprisingly, there has been a worsening of unemployment 
and a general erosion in living standards. 
8. Although the military government attempted to introduce policy reforms 
in its last days (see annex 3), these came too late to make any appreciable 
difference. When it collapsed, it left behind it an economy in ruins and a 
society in extreme destitution. Here it is worth indicating that this is true when 
one focuses on the monetary sectors of the Ethiopian Economy and recorded 
trade. But in Ethiopia there exists also a barter economy and big amount of 
unrecorded monetary trade. They have permitted Ethiopians to survive. 
Information given to me when visiting the mercato i.e. the biggest market in 
Ethiopia which is also the biggest one in Africa lead me to conclude that the 
Ethiopian Monetary Economy is about to be fully black marketed. This is the 
result of the reforms announced in the March 5, 1990 govemment's programme 
(although not fully implemented) and new government's intentions shaped in the 
EPTP. Since march 5, 1990 it has been made clear for private agents that 
something irreversible has occured. This was particulary true as far as the 
govement's capability to command the economy was concerned. As a result 
unrecorded (monetary) trade increased. Its importance may be as follows : the 
daily turn-over of mercato is birr 5m compared to a yearly GDP figure of birr 10 
I I  *I , JI 
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billion. The barter economy is that of agriculture i.e. the dominant sector of the 
economy, the labour force and the export receipts (40 and 90% respectively). 
Agriculture is an Ethiopian key issue. Increased black market and barter 
economy accounted for in a framework of closed factories mean a gradual 
process of reduced fiscal receipts i.e. a loss of economic power to the 
government in search of its legitimacy. 
C) The Economic Policy of Ethiopia for the transition period (EPTP) 
9. It is introduced by strongly assessing that the lack of a democratic system 
was the principal cause of the country's economic decline (5). In this respect none 
definition of a democracy within an Ethiopian context was nevertheless given. 
That is also true as far the definition of a market-based economy is concerned. 
The latter point worth to be remembered given that the main direction of the EPTP 
is to lead the economy to a more market orientated one. Having said that does not 
mean to put prejudice on the new policy or efforts deployed so as to increase 
popular participation during the transition period. Indeed, one should be aware 
that even in our societies and economies where people are accustomed to enjoy 
democracy and market they may be unable to define these ones properly. So, the 
lack of definitions may be the result of ignorance or uncapability rather than the 
reflection either of a lack of will or bad will. In this respect, it is worth indicating 
that the economic policy of the transition period is designed to pave the way 
towards the establishment of a permanent democratic order (6). Further, it is 
written that as such it should not be expected to bring about substantial 
growth in the economy. The consolidation of stability in the economy should 
be considered as satisfactory accomplishment of the transition period 
consistent with expectations in the political field. 
10. Although the EPTP is shaped as a list of intentions expected to give rise to 
political committments for the announced reforms to be implemented in such a 
way as to avoid Ethiopia to collapse, it is worth indicating that it is first of all a 
consensus policy. I t  aims at assuring peace i.e. political continuity after the 
expected elections. Therefore its intemal consistency as how the various 
intentions articulate or do not articulate reflect both its political nature. That may 
5 That is the only difference between the government's analysis of the Ethiopian background and that presented 
during the Conference on the State of the Ethiopian Economy. 
6 That is absolutely consistent with the lack of democracy which was strongly asserted to be the main cause of 
the country's economic decline. 
I* 
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be one of the reasons for which its does not define either a democracy or market- 
based economy in an ethiopian context. Apart from that, conversations I got with 
Ethiopian economists lead me to conclude they were not all very aware of the 
dependency between market functioning and political order. Economists from 
the public bodies were more aware of the articulating process or interface and 
furthermore the existence of various ways to articulate growth and political order 
as was the case within European societies. 
11. The main intentions of the Economic Policy of Ethiopia for the 
transition period are the following : 
a) to set up Ethiopia with a mixed economy. This leads : 
1") to redefine the role of the State and the private sector in the 
economy so as to increase their relative efficiency. As a result the role of the 
State in the economy as an investor, monitor and owner should be limited at the 
opposite of its managerial functions (through macro economic planning such as 
fiscal and monetary policy for instance) or that as a supplier of incentives to 
encourage the private sector or that as a supplier of appropriate rules for both 
economic agents, markets and needed articulating schemes. As an outcome of this 
first main intention, the State participation in sectors would reduce being 
concentrated in sectors which are crucial for the economy and/or cannot easily 
attract private capital because of a rather long period to get activities profitable or 
imply large-scale units ; 
2") On the basis of the preceding the State participation would be 
concentrated : in the agriculture large-scale units ; in the following industrial 
sectors : mining and energy, large engineering and metallurgical plants, principal 
production plants in the chemical industry such as fertilisers and pharmaceuticals 
or plants which supply raw materials to the chemical industry ; in the dominant 
export and import sector i.e. the coffee export and oil import ones ; in the 
transport (Airlines, Railroads, Sea) and communication sectors, the financial 
(banks and insurance) and social (health, education) ones. Further, the State 
will remain the land owner. It is worth indicating that State concentration would 
not mean private sector exclusion from the sectors where State dominates ; 
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3") Analogously to the State, the private sector would be concentrated : in 
agriculture, retail and wholesale trade, roadtransport, housing and the 
unformal sectors. In the case of wholesale trade the document indicates that the 
government may find it necessary to exercise direct control over trade of essential 
commodities and will in any event closely guide and monitor such trade. 
b) to lead the mixed economy into a more market orientated one ; 
This means precisely to create a climate favorable to entrepreneurship i.e. to value 
private initiative through the society values system ; to supply appropriate rules 
and incentives ; to eliminate state controls on the operation of the private sectors 
(capital ceilings, area of operation, etc ...) ; to submit both the state and the private 
sector to the market rules i.e. the profitability, management autonomy and fair 
competition ones so as not to prejudice the private sector. 
c) to recognise market rights ; 
They include not only rights to create a farm or factory, to manage it with 
autonomy, to use freely what has been supplied, to get a free access to relevant 
input, but also to sell the farm or the factory including {he ground on which it was 
located. The late right remains restricted in the case of agriculture. A peasant 
cannot sell his ground for commercial purposes. The State remains the rural 
land owner at least during the transition period. Nevertheless, peasants are given 
tenure security. Market functioning implies also the right to move i.e. to settle 
and resettle. Here the document indicates that resettlement ordered by the State 
must be halted. Resettlement have to be absolutely voluntary on the part of the 
settlers and acceptable to the expressed wish of the people already living in areas 
designated for such programmes. In this respect, nevertheless resettled farmers 
will be gently discouraged from moving back to their places of origin. The right is 
also restricted in the case of urban land. The State will distribute urban land to 
promoters, staying the urban land owner (at least during the transition period). 
As far as buildings are concerned, the main initiative is to return to their 
original owners those ones that had been nationalized in 1975, subject to certain 
conditions. 
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d) to restructure state farms and entreprises and close down those 
ones when this is no more possible ; 
e) to favor domestic private capital through expected market 
functioning ; 
f') to increase popular participation at  any level in the society ; 
That leads the government to propose to give workers'representatives one third of 
the voting rights on state entreprises boards. And also to balance profitability and 
employment before deciding to close down state farms and factories when 
necessary. 
g) to secure foreign aid and utilize it in coordinated ways for 
productive purposes in the economy ; 
12. Intentions are also revealed as far as the stance of the applied 
macro policy is concerned. Indeed, the document mentions : 
a) a fiscal policy which would more balanced receipts and 
expenditure i.e. aiming at  reducing the budget deficit ; a reform taxation in 
the case of agriculture through which taxes would be replaced by fair levies ; 
b) a monetary policy regulating inflation ; 
c) a generally free output price policy except in the case of retail 
trade. In this case, the government will fix price ceiling on critically essential 
commodities in view of the hardships facing the society today and considering the 
time needed to achieve a commensurate supply situation ; 
d) the maintain of foreign exchange control regulations on the 
systematic allocation of available earnings. Here the only innovation proposed is a 
partiel retention scheme for the benefit of the exporters ; 
l i  l h u  
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e) the maintain of the exchange rate between birr and US $. 
Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that the document asseses the birr 
overvaluation compared to the US dollar but it defers the question to an indefinite 
future ; 
f3 a land conservation agriculture policy and a revitalisation one. 
For instance, the government is intending to allocate a greater share of its budget 
and manpower resources to agriculture. 
O) Comments on the Economic Policy of Ethiopia for the transition period (71 
1 - General comments 
13. One of the main feature is that the EPTP has posponed most structural 
reforms, for instance, those related to land tenure, ressetlement, villagization, 
decentralization, etc ... The dominant argument lies explicity in the transitional 
nature of the new government or, more precisely, on the need to secure peace. In 
the case of land rural tenure, the governmentk will has been to avoid the risks of 
tenancy in the South of the country, established monopolies and increased rural 
migrations. As an outcome, the document concludes that the State should remain 
the land owner at least during the transition period. This has been made 
clearer through the second document (i.e. which exists only in amharic version). 
The case of urban land is analogous to that of rural land. The lack of purchasing 
power could create price distortions and speculation giving rise to impoverishing 
process in the case of low income people at the opposite of high income one. So, 
the State should remain the owner of urban land. 
14. The land tenure issue is a very debatable question. It has been recently 
adressed by a group of economists including five Nobel prize in the case of ... the 
late USSR. Sending a letter to M. Gorbatchev the economists demonstrated in the 
light of the Walras'theory (Théorie mathématique du prix des terres et de leur 
rachat par 1'Etat - 1880) that land had to remain state ownership. This would 
permit to collect a special taxe which would be a function of : 
7 
paragraphs. 
I benefitted from notes written by the E.E.C'S economic adviser at Addis Ababa to write the following 
13 
(i) land yield as was the case with Ricardo's analysis (Essays on the Influence of 
the Low Price of Corn on the Profit of Stock - 1815) ; 
(ii) population growth and ; 
(iii) public investments. 
15. Another feature to be noted is that the new policy articulates growth 
facets only through a description of policy intentions i.e. without the use of a 
macro economic framework indicating how growth should proceed during 
the transition period. Then one understands why the words consolidation of 
stability have been used (para 9). The EPTP overlooks also important long term 
issues (population growth and its geographical distribution, environment, human 
resources development), sensitive reforms (labour law) and also some economic 
sectors (e.g. tourism and its related services). In this respect, it neglects the 
unformal sector which has become one of the dominant challenge to the 
government and the society. Indeed, the unformal sector reduces fiscal receipts 
when public expenditure are likely to increase given increased needs to fulfill. 
That issue related to the budget evolution and further indebtness position of 
the State is not adressed in the government's document. That might be rather 
detrimental to the economy given adverse implications on monetary policy, 
sectoral policy etc ... In this respect, the question of securing enough foreign aid is 
not really adressed. 
16. A very interesting point of the document is the government's attention to 
mix market rules (profitability) and social concern i.e. employment protection. 
The question is adressed in the case of farms and factories closing down. And also 
that of market rules and income distribution in the case of rural and urban land. It 
is rather unfortunate not to get any clarification as how to mix the different points. 
2 - Comme nts on spec [fie issues 
17. On the foreign trade front the reestablishing of state monopoly in the 
case of coffee export (and oil import) may be viewed as a step backwards. Indeed 
since 1987/88, coffee trade has been partly reopened to private exporters, who 
handled between 10 and 20% of the market. Reestablishing state monopoly might 
have negative implications for export receipts. Indeed, it should lead to lower 
price (as was the case in the past : peasants received no more than 40 per cent of 
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world price on average at long run), lower quality premiums and high smuggling. 
Given the existence of a more favorable exchange rate in Eritrea, it could even be 
explosive. That could also be the case given the partial retention scheme. 
Indeed, exporters could find much more profitable to export through Eritrea using 
black-market networks and keep what they need. 
18. The question of Eritrean cession is not adressed in the document. That 
is not only a rather sensible political issue, it has also becoming a short term 
economic challenge given the de facto devaluation of the birr in Eritrea. That will 
bring additional pressure on the Ethiopian system by encouraging the diversion of 
export trade and reducing foreign exchange inflows. Further, Ethiopia is about to 
lose definitely its seaports such as Tio, Massawa, Assab and as such the related 
external duties. Not to mention also 40 per cent of its manufacturing output. 
19. At the sectoral level a lot of policy issues are not adressed. For 
instance, the agriculture sector needs supporting services previously issued by 
the producers' co-operatives. None intention is put forward as how to re-organize 
the crumbling service co-operatives so that they can perform sustainable, 
economically viable and socially acceptable functions. The government proposes 
the replacement of taxes by "fair levies" without any clarification on these ones. 
The industry sector needs urgently spare parts for factories to be reopened at 
least in the suburb of A.A., etc ... This issue is not touched. The question of the 
credit policy with its implications for small and large scale units i.e. private and 
state participations in the economy is not adressed 
20. The document does not explicitly mention the challenges (8) the 
Ethiopian Economy has to faced with during the transition period. So, it 
remains very difficult to appreciate the pertinency of the listed intentions as a 
tool to stabilize the Economy as it has been indicated. In this respect to 
stabilize most likely has more something to do with peace than growth. And 
finally, it is worth indicating that the nature of the policies (intentions of) assumed 
during the transition period towards private investment versus public ones, 
domestic accumulation versus foreign one etc ... are not mentioned. This is also 
true as far as the links between various sectors of the economy are concerned. 
There is a lack of intersectoral concern. 
8 Apart from those indicated at paragraph 16. 
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21. In the light of the preceding, it appears that one has to wait for political 
committments to be able to appreciate the EPTP. This places economic operators 
on a waiting position (for instance expecting a new investment code) which might 
be rather detrimental to the economy by postponing growth needed to stabilize the 
economy. This could be particularly true as far as the value of the birr is 
concerned. The Ethiopian diaspora living in the US strongly expects a devaluation 
of the birr to the US $. For it that is the condition to get rapatriated funds. This is 
a real challenge given that the amount of available funds might be as big as 
two times the Ethiopian GDP (birr 10 billion). The devaluation of the currency 
is also an issue strongly supported by the World Bank. 
IV - MAIN ECONOMIC CHALLENGES DURING THE TRANSITION 
PERIOD 
22. Assuming peace to be secured and strenghened and foreign aid to be 
given to restore basic infrastructures, four economic challenges dominate the 
transition period. There are : 
1) how to increase food-sufficiency i.e. reduce the risk to famine ? 
2) at what speed to restore basic infrastructure ? 
3) how to close the employment disequilibrium ? 
4) how to avoid Ethiopia to be black marketed ? 
A) A Food sufficiency (or the challenging agriculture) 
23. Here the focus is on agriculture potentials. It is how to get an immediate 
increase of output supply and at what costs for the budget ? It reveals a very 
complex problem because agriculture potentials are deeply constrained by soil 
erosion in Ethiopia. This is particularly true in the Highlands which account for 
90% of the population and economic activities, 95% of land cultivated and two 
16 
thirds of lifestock. Of 53.6m ha in the Highlands, 6m are highly eroded, 8.5m are 
mediumly eroded, 13m are eroded and 10.9 are susceptible to be eroded. This lets 
15.2m ha only to be not eroded. FAO and the late government of Ethiopia with 
finance from the World Bank in 1983-85 carried out a study to present a rural 
development strategy for the severely eroded Ethiopian Highland. The study 
(never officially accepted by the government of Ethiopia) estimated that over 1900 
million tons of soil are lost from the Highlands of Ethiopia annually. The losses 
are of productive top soil, and they are for all practical purposes irreversible. The 
study characterizes the Highlands of Ethiopia as "one of the largest areas of 
ecological degradation in Africa, if not in the world". One of the findings of 
the study is that, if present trends continue, by the year 2010 some 38000 sq.km of 
the Highlands would be eroded down to bare rock, a further 60000 sq.km would 
have a soil depth of 1Ocm or below which would be too shallow to support 
cropping. This would mean that in that year almost 10 million people would have 
to derive their food and income from sources other than cropping their own lands, 
and that they would have to be absorbed elsewhere in the economy. 
24. The preceding indicates that the Ethiopian authorities are not only 
challenged by agriculture output at short run (the need to feed the population) but 
also at long one (the need to stop natural resources degradation to sustain long 
term growth). At short run, it is obvious to say that there will be further land 
degradation when people will ressetle to peace and the government will give them 
incentives to supply more. Agriculture challenges also the government in terms of 
villagization and ressetlement in the long run. Indeed, it is now obvious that such 
processes will get further extension in the framework of land conservation 
agriculture policy i.e. growth sustainability. 
B) Restoration of basic infrastructure 
25. A plan of restoration has been proposed to the foreign donors. It has 
been coordinated by the World Bank. Most likely it will be fully supported. 
Therefore the challenged problem will be at what speed restoration would 
occur. Restoration offers opportunities to create jobs or more precisely to 
accomodate with soldiers to be demobilized. Such a choice has been made by the 
Eritrean authorities. Indeed, during two years soldiers will be used as labour force 
to restore basic infrastructure. 
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C) Employment demand 
26. That is the most obvious challenge during the transition period. 
Indeed, every one is aware of the need to demobilize soldiers and to sent these 
ones back home to avoid congestion, increased poverty, social troubles in A.A. 
Something like 300,000 to 500,000 soldiers have to be demobilized (9). 
Accounting for the latter ones'families between 1 to 2m people have to be helped 
to go back home. The Ethiopian authorities have asked the intemational 
community to help them by giving (lending ?) them an amount of US $ 154m. It 
covers the living expenditure for one year as far as the urban population is 
concerned, 15 months in the case of rural people. Soldiers to be demobilized i.e. 
being given job or money to get (or create) job, go back to farming reveal not 
only an employment opportunity problem but also that of skilled labour 
force. Indeed, the army was the best trained power the country had. So, the 
army is quasi the lonely resource of skills immediately available for restructured 
factories, farms and privatization of the economy when neglecting the black- 
market entrepreneurs. The US government has an agreement with the Ethiopian 
one under which. 
(i) a reduced army would be reconstructed ; 
(ii) the rest would have to be accomodated properly. 
In this respect, it is worth indicating that no much progress have been made up to 
now. As an outcome, the army is in the way to be accomodating by political 
groups with few gains for peace and recovery and likely increased black-market 
activities. Apart from the army there was another source of skills, that of the 
"Communist party". It represented the country capabilities to organize, manage 
etc ... From this viewpoint, the decision to made the party illegal, contrarily to 
open expressed US views, might be an economic nonsense. 
D) Black market economy 
27. Ethiopia is embarked upon a transition to be fully black-marketed. 
That is a result of announced reforms (March 5, 1990 ; 1991) and overthrowing of 
the DERG regime. So, a market-based economy has already begun 
functioning in Ethiopia. But as such it has also begun to "escape" from 
9 Not accounted for the Eritreait soldiers (and their families). 
I 9 
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government's regulation and taxation. Further, it is challenging government's 
policy. That is obvious in terms of the parallel exchange rate but not only. Then, 
the question is no more how to pass from a command economy to a market- 
oriented one but rather how to manage black-market activities such as to 
render these ones market-activities simply. Apart from intending to recuperate 
taxes, the government has no other choice if it is intending to increase 
privatization (10). Indeed, black-market entrepreneurs are "the animal spirits" of 
Ethiopia at the moment. Further, they also represent potential domestic 
accumulation in a country where there is a shortage of saving (compared to 
investment). As such, Ethiopia is a test-case, not only for developing countries 
but also developed ones. Indeed, black-market activites increase also in the 
late Eastern countries. It adresses the following question to macroeconomists, 
governments, etc ... : how to mix private initiatives with macro planning when : 
(i) deregulation occurs or more precisely the nature of regulation changes (rapidly) 
being less on the decision process making and more on its related issues (wages, 
profits, unemployment, ...) in a society where the 
(ii) social consensus has been challenged through different ways including that of 
political order. 
CONCLUSION 
28. On the basis of the preceding comments, one can indicate that Ethiopia 
during the transition period will be economically challenged by agriculture supply, 
employment demand (and skills) and substitution of black market activities for 
market ones. The outcome or derived challenges are a reduction of fiscal basis 
while social needs to be fulfilled increase, increased risks of social unstability (and 
maybe of peace), permanent risks to famine. Ethiopia will also be challenged by 
the expected devaluation of the birr which is the condition to get private capital 
inflows. As far as non economic variables are concerned, there is a risk of political 
disintegration (Eritrea, Oromoland, Ogaden) of Ethiopia in the framework of 
increased unstability in the all Horn of Africa. The international community has 
to be aware of all these challenges so as 
accordance. 
to shape its help and requirement in 
10 Which is aprerequisite for a mixed market-based ecoiwmy. 
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The Macroecononiic Performance of 
The Ethiopian Economy 1974-90 
Eshetu Chole 
Department of Economics 
& 
Mekonnen Manyazewal 
Ministry of Planning 
This paper attempts to review tlie agregate petformaizce of tlie Ethiopiaiz economy 
duriiig the e m  of military mie. The DergS economic record is rcssessed relati\v to the ecoiioiTzic 
situation it iiiherited ori usur?iing poi tw mid rvitli refereizce to its o~viz declared objectiws. 
This record is disr?znl in virtrial[\~ every respect. Duting tile period Linder corzsidercrtiori 
the rate of groitjtli of GDP uveraged I .  9%per ciiiiiuui, which feil comiderably S ~ O I T  of the 
populcrtioii growth rute, assumed to have beeiz 2.7%. This represents a decline itz per cupita 
iizcotize of about O.&’%, a particulurl) telling statistic because it reveals that the standard of liviizg 
of the averuge Ethiopian, already orle of the loicest in the world, suffered firther deterioration 
diiniig the era of military nile. While this represents the overall picture, the pefonnance of the 
ecoizorny I-Z.’CIS highly uneveiz over the )’ears, characterized as it was by drastic ups aizd dorviis. 
The basic uiider(yiiig factor behind the disnial aggregate record war the disappointkg 
perfonname of tlie conzi?2odi~-producirig sectors, most iiotably agriculture, which grew by a 
mere O. 7%, a @Il 2% below tlie populatioii growth rate aiid lower tliaii tlie growth rate of all 
other sectors with the exception of coiutniction. The pe@onnaiice of iizdustly (maizufactunng 
and coizstructiori), which grew by 2.59, rvas more respectable, but it was confirzed with’ii 
perimeters strictly circunzscribed by the agricultural sector. The services on the whole registered 
a growth rate of 3.574 the highest growth having been recorded by public adininistratioiz aiid 
defence. Iii general, the ecoizoniy experienced no structural transfomation. 
p 
Owing largely to a cirmintic nie iri goveniineiit coi.rrur?zption, the saving rate decliized 
from I396 on the eve of the revolutioli to about 4% il? the last years. hi contrast, the trend in 
iizvesti?zeiit has gellerally been an upr-2-ard one, especially during the second half of our period. 
Decliiiirig saving rates com bitzed with tising iiivestnzerzt rates create a steadily widening resource 
gap, which meant increasing recourse to estenial sources to finance the country’s iizvestment 
efforts. Consequeiitly, the cowmy’s debt position /ias beerz deteriorating at ari alanniiig rate. 
f c - 
A corollary of the wideiiiiig resource gcip hm been a large aiirì steadily widening budget 
deficit, financed by external flows and doniestic borrowing from the banking system. The latter 
led to a drastic increase in iiioney supply, with inflationary consequences. It follows that the state 
of the balaiice of payments war also unhealthy. 
The economy wcl s  tlius caught ìri a crisis that \vas deepening toiziards the end of the Derg 
era. Tlie i?zajor underking causes of the crisis have been war, a riegative policy environrizent, 
nil imfai~orable demographic dJ*iinmic.y, enviroiir7ientcrl degrmlntion, low levels of iiivestineirt, 
irieJYïciericy iii iiivesti?ieiit, u low leifel of techtiology und adverse estermil factors. 
Although the Derg citteiizpted reforms in IVovei7iber 1988 and March 1990, these reforms 
came too late to save the day. The economic legacy of military i d e  is therefore a poor otie 
indeed uiid inferior to wliat it inlierited from tlie iiiiperial regime. In  terins of econonzic 
iievelopnieiit, therefore, tlie Derg era' repsesented seveilteen lost years. 
I 
The Relevance of the Improvement Approach 
to XgricuItural Growth in Ethiopia 
Dejene Aredo 
De part ment of Economics 
Addis Ababa University 
The way out of tlie prevailing ugn'cultural crisis in Ethiopia i.r obviously tlirougli ìticreases 
in productivity. However, past experielice has sliortx that tlie costs of )vicie-spread uses of the 
Iiigli-)*ieldiiig varieties and chei?iical fenilizers are prohibitive. In  this study it lias been attempted 
to sugest a less costly and yet effective npproacli to agricultural develdpntent. The relevance 
of existing models of growth is investigated in the light of pattenu of resource endowntents of 
tlie country. Historical evidence fiom Great Britain and Japan and empirical evidence from 
Ethiopia are presented in support of tlie iniprovenieiit approach to agricultural growth. Tlie 
sugested approach is put iii perspectì\*e in tlie concluding pait of the study. 
Public Policy, Markets and Technical Progress 
in the Grain Plough Culture 
Taye Mengistae 
Department of Economics 
The grain-plough culture is probczbl) tlie rizost iinportaiit of the various techiiologiccrl 
systems of tiuditional agriciilture iir Ethiopia, in teriils of both the size of populatioii engaged 
and geograplzical exteruion . Changes in rural ecoìzoinies of the culture best understood as 
responses Of an entire xysteni of tlie flow of resources betiiseen activities and institutions to 
e;rtei7zal “shocks1’. These niay originate in changes in cliiizatic conditions, shifts in marketiiig 
enviromzent, refonns in public policy or some coin bination of these. The more recurrent of 
policy itiduced ‘Ipositive shocks’: can be classified into teclinological interveiztioi,zs firzal deinand 
injections aiid trcinsfer injections. i 
Based oii the inter-activit), aiialJ*sis of a village ecotzoniy of the culture, this paper is a 
critique of some of the premises of crtnwit r-nral cievelopr?ieiit progranzr?ies iiz tlie corrritiy niid 
approaclzes to refornzs in agrarian policy. Coiitrary to these preiiiises, tlie paper argues, final 
deninrid injections may be superior to traiufer injections as nieans of raising the incomes or the 
marketable surplus of rural econoniies iii the culture. Final deniand irzjectioizs inay also be 
ìnore effective in those tenns when directed at 1iome activities rather than faming  and at 
traditionally less traded grain types rather tfian those observed as the ìnain traditions “expoHs” 
of an economy. Furdienuore, it is a stroiig possibility tlint the same iiijectioru. are a viable 
substitute to projects of tecliriological ijzterveiition sliordd these be not feasible in a locality. The 
agrorioinic bias of charactensing such projects at the moment is also seems projects to be 
iuijust$ed. Results supposirzg the case for final cienzarid injections imply that techiiological 
intenwitions niay be. more effective when directed at horne activities ratlier than fann activities 
and at less krzown crops of a rural economy ratlier than a traditional ìmjor “erports‘: 
I 
Economic Reform and Agricultural Deco-Operativisation 
in Ethiopia: Implications for Agricultural 
Production in 1990s 
Ale maye hu Li remo 
Silice the March 1990 ecorioriiic refom, rural Ethiopia Izas esperienced agiicultural 
decoperativisatiorz eniuiiatiiig fioin abolitioiz of producers ' co-operatives aiid c m m  bliiig of service 
co-operatives. This treiid \vil1 llave seLjeral coiisequences orz the rural ecotionzy iiz general arid 
agricultrcral productiori iiz particular. This paper urgiies that abolishiq producers' co-opercitive 
firinis is u robust idea rriid less Iiurinjìil to agi-icultitrul production in tiie long-tim although it 
creates sliott-ten?z dislocatioirs criid disniptiorzs to food procluctioiz irz the peusunt sector. On the 
other harid, tlie puper coiiterids that the dissolution of service co-operutives cun not be tolerated 
given their multi-faceted arid importaiit role in rural developnieiit aiid agricultural production. 
It is iinnzirzeizt that die link betweeii tiie state aiid peasmt sectors will be cut-off aiid 
rural/ugriculturul developmm will be at stake if tlie service co-operutives are let to disappear 
just like producers' co-operatives. Iini7iediate iizeasicres should be uridertakerz to re-organize tlie 
crimi blijig service co-operatives so that they can pelfomz sustaiiiable, ecoizoniically viable and 
socially acceptable jùnctiorzc;. 
. 
I 
Economic Efficiency of Food Grain Marketing 
in Southern Ethiopia a h  the March 1990 Reform 
I 
BY ' , 
Wolday Amha 
Awassa College of Agriculture 
AA U 
The ii?iprover?zent 0 1  the perfonnurice of the food graiiz niarketitig .ystenz in Ethiopia is 
{believed to  be a part aiid parcel of tire agricultural developmem. The iiieflcieiicy of the food 
grabz marketing systerii lias been repeatedly pointed out by many researchers as a inajor bamer 
to the rdzole developrizent process. Moreover, there s e e m  to be a lack of systematic study on tlie 
perfonnarzce of the " k e t i n g  system in agriculture which would give basic irzfonnation to tlie 
policy makers. 
. 
1 
Tlie aiin of this study is to assess the impact of the food grain inarketiiig refoniz of March 
1990 by using qualitative and quantitative approaches. Here, market integration, seasojial and 
spacial price variations are estimated from the tirne-series weekly price data of the 17 major 
market in Soutliem Ethiopia. 
Tlie study broadly concludes: (a)  the barriers to entry in tlze fooci grain wholesale and 
retail private trade has itiiproved. The size of tlie licensed and unlicensed food gruirz trade lius 
iiicrensed after the Marcli 1990 market liberalimtion policy reform; (6) tlie price correlation 
coeflrcient and the coefficient of variatiorz iiz tlie 17 iizurkets 'lias increused ufter the reforin 
sliowirzg a inovenient of tile food grain marketing system closer to the coinpetitive model; (c) 
the role of AAfC and tlie seivice cooperatives in tlie food grain marketing process lias declined 
sigriificantly ; (d) the iizeaiz price of food graiii lias increased by 30 percent in 1 I months time 
inzivediately after tlie refonii; (e) the anti-food grairi piivate truders attitude of the government 
lias also shown an ii?ipro\wneiit. 
Rural Credit and  Peasant Indebtedness: 
A Case Study in 8o r th  S h e w  
BY 
Gebrehiwot Ageba 
Department of Economics 
Addis Ababa University 
Private peasant households in Ethiopia have beerz excluded from the credit services of 
foniial credit institutions not only because imtitutional credit sources, as they have been 
operating so far, are not lt-ell suited to cater to their needs but also as a niatter of deliberate 
govenzment policy. Those rz;ho need to be helped most in getting access to resources have been 
the first to be denied. 
This paper looks into the role of credit in a pensant houseliold economy, the sources of 
credit and tlieir eligibility criteria, and the debt situation and credit utilization of peasant , 
households. 
Infonnal lenders havera crucial role in nieeting the credit needs of pemant households 
as they provide them what institutional lenders can not. Relatives and friends/izeiglzbors are tlze 
most important lenders. The money lender (in his various guises of professional lender, big 
fanner, or trader/lnerchant) has a very insignijicant role as a source of credit. Contrary to 
expectations borrowing from non-institutional sources involve either no interest charge at all or 
very low rzoniirial interest rates despite the fuct that there is no competitiori from formal credit 
iiistitutiorzs. Borrower peasant households are highly in debt relative to their incoine. Default 
rate is very low but rescheduling of loans is commoa Social sanctions against defaulting 
borrowers have contributed much to the observed low default rate. Uiider the severe constraints 
and competing needs they face borrower households have allocated a good proportion of their 
loans ';Droductively". 
Recent Trends in the Development of Manufacturing 
Industries in Ethiopia 
Bulti Terfassa 
Ethiopian Cement Corporation 
The degree of economic developriient of a country is always tneasured by the size of the 
contribution of iiianufrrctririiig industiJ9 to GDP aiid its sliure of ei?iployrnent in tlie tord labour 
force. Tfie basic issues in economic developiiient have therefore been how to maintain 
industrial growth in advrrriced countries arid biing about industrialization in the developing 
countries. 
Inward and outward looking industrial developnient strategies liave been adopted by 
many developing countries but the success stones are h i t e d  to a few south emt Asian countries. 
Etlziopia lias adopted the iiiiport substitution industrial strategy since the early fiffies. 
The strategy remained ir1 operation etleri after the iiwtitrrtionnl change iri 1974. 
The impact of tlie import substitutiori strategy ori the development of rnaniifactunng 
industry for the period 1970-1989 has been assessed and disappointing peifonnance Iim been 
observed. Growth in output slowed particularly in recent years and per capita supply of basic 
manufacturing items lias declined. 
The effects of the strategy on tlie structure of manufacturing indust?y has also been 
analyzed and the result shows that both sectorally and branch wise the industrial structure more 
or less remained the sanie in the last 20 years. 
Wïth sound policy íhere is no reason why the rate of growth of industry should not 
recover in the 1990's and rise gradually thereafrer. For this to be achieved, industrial policy will 
need to be overhauled in the early 1990s. Successjûl development seeins to require the 
combination of iniport substitution and export promotion strategies than giving undue emphasis 
to one and neglecting tlie other. 
Efficiency of Ethiopian Public Manufacturing 
Industries and the Policy Environment 
Alemu Mekonnen 
Department of Economics 
Addis Ababa University 
paper tries to look into the relationship between efficiency of Ethiopian public 
ing industiies and the policy enviromrent. The financial results of these industries 
t they are profitable on average, the niajority operating with high finaltcial rates of 
spite of this most of the eriterptises have been faced with shortage of financial 
utly because of the govenwient's financial policy which requires public enterprises 
.lost of their surplus to the Treasury. 'Clrith respect to allocative efficiency, while inore 
'tJie sampled enterprises were found to be eflcierit there are some which are highly 
u shown by DRC coefficients. A cot?ipan.son of $riancial aiid economic profits 
xistence of enterprises ullocntiveb inefficient but fiìiaricially profitable and vice-versa, 
ginly due to the governinent S pricing and trade policies. The highly centralized 
.king system, the eristence of escess cupacity and the incentive system which does not 
.flcient utilization of resources indicate the possibility of improvement in technical 
cy through policy refon??, which would in turn lead to ir?iprovei?ients in allocative 
id financial perfomiance of enterprises. It is suggested that non-efficiency objectives 
rlities be taken into account with dyiianzic allocative efficiency considerations in 
The State of Small Scale Industries in Ethiopia 
Problems and Some Policy Issues 
BY 
Solonion Wole 
Ministry of Industy 
111 scale industry sector in Ethiopia is characterized by low level of development, 
fig others, is caused by nikguided developriient policy perused by the past regime. 
.Yy, the role of the sector by way of contributing to GDP, eniploynzent and foreign 
mings of the country i~ very low. Nevertheless, given adequate policy environment, 
-1 of the sector is inznzense. Thk has been witnessed by the emergence of a new class 
leurs engaged in skill intensive activities in the past few years, and the recent rise in 
the miniber of potenticil investors willing to establish niamfacturiirg industries eveit at CL tinte of 
political uncertainty. 
Against this background, this paper attempts to high light the problems affecting the 
development of sinall scale industries and to outline some policy issues required for the long 
terni developnient of the sector. 
Energy and Economic Growth in Ethiopia 
Mengistu Teferra 
hlinistry of Planning 
Ethiopia’s energy resources niniiily consist of hydro, geotliennal, natural gas LG bionzass. 
The bulk of inaiziniate energy supply is froin bionzass sources. Petroleum & hydroelectricity 
constitute the bulk of the modeni e i iew supply source, with petroleum accouitting for tlie lion’s 
share of the supply. 
Petroleunt is niainly used in tramport. However, kerosine demand in the household 
sector is riking at an appreciable rate and ntay SOOH become a major petroleum fuel consunied 
outside the transport sector. Industy reniains the greatest coizumer of electricity, but 
conrumption growth rate is highest for the service sector. The household sector is tlie biggest 
consunier of bioniass fiels and tliere hre ample sigru of shortage of supply of these fuels in 
urbniz areas. 
Ethiopia’s energy resources are huge in comparison to the level & rate of utilization of 
energ, at present. Only the lack of indigenous oil deposits niay be seen as a major shortcoming. 
The role of oil can, however be takeii over by iiydroelectricity and natural gas for most 
applications. Oil- based electricity supply lias, for example, been replaced by hydroelectricity. 
Likewise, city passenger transport can be fuelled by hydroelectricity if modal shift is niade to 
electric trains. The sanie is true for freight transport in certain busy corridors. Agricullural 
production Rr industrial processing cari benpfit inmensely froin the mailability of indigenous 
energy resources. 
The advantages of fiydroelectriciry become niore pronounced in the case of e n e w -  
intensive industries like iron & steel niaking processes. There are constraints in the development 
of the energy resources but overall it appears that given the right niacroecononiic, social & 
political environment, the energy resources of Ethiopia can play a positive role for economic 
growth. 
Food People Eat - The Energy Economics 
of hiera and W> 
Bereket Kebede 
Department of Economics 
A.A.U. 
First by using tlie aiiiount of materials and energy needed to produce injera and WOt the 
puper estimates the input coefficients. And b)] using these coefficients, the total aìnount of 
i?iuterials and enero for preparing itijern and by all the households in the village of Sirba 
and Godeti are estimated. The figures generated clearly show thut izijera and production 
is ail '7nditstiy" uccOLUttiiig for a large amount of resource LUC. I n  addition, after estimating tlie 
eiiergy contents of iìi.ierrr m d  The 
coizsuiuptioir of i1i.iel-a and 1.1:0t doesn't SIIOIV sigiiificant seasonal variutions but tlie per cripitu 
food energy i?ieiiibeis of different wealth stratu get significarztly differ, indicating that the 
rtutritionnl status of the richer pemaiits is fur better than the poor. Related with the consumption 
of ii1jer.a ana' a problem affectiiig nutritional levels of peasants are discussed: nimition 
wastuge due to diseases, etc., effect of seasonul variations in agricultural work, adaptatioii to low 
level of food cotuumptioïi, distribution of food in the household, etc. The problem of a nutional 
inconie accouiitiiig system ìi1hich doesn't report housework activities is also i?ientioned. 
their riutritional value to the peusalits is esarnined. 
Issues of Human Resource Development in Ethiopia 
Getahun Gebru 
Ministry of Planning 
Huittan Resources Development (HRD) can be defined us the developnient and 
utilization of /iuniari potentials for social economic developnient, essentially though education, 
training and einployment education is the key change agent for nioviiig societies along the 
developrnerit process. Thus developiiig countries give liiglz priori@ to education both to 
universalize pniitaiy education and to meet their skilled inaiiporuer requirenzents. This led to 
the explosion of school enrollment bet1zQeeiz the 1960s and 1980s. 
These rapid rate of expansion of enrollt?ient, however, could not be sustained into the 
1980s due to tlie econoniic crisis of the 1980s. Developing countries could not finance the 
required increasing level of educational costs, hence stagnation of school enrolment and 
deterioration of the quality of education nssurized crisis proportion. 
. 
1) 
The objective of this short paper is to given ali overview of tlie currelit level of HRD iii 
EtJiiopia,niujor issues in HRD, and reconi”wiion ofpolicy measures which should be looked 
into in greater scope and detail. 
Educatioizul developnient beiìig the basic coiiipoiient of HRD, its level in Ethiopia cari 
be msessed in teniis of literacy rate, primary and secondary school participation rates) the 
diversity) level and nuinber of graduates of techiiical and higher ,education This is the 
quantitutive aspect and the qualitutive dimemiou is relatively difficult 
to mx”xì. 
As a result of 22 rounds of literacy campaigns, the country’s level of literacy hacl been 
raised fi.onz less ttiari 1 O percent in I979 to 62 percerit in 1990. This implies the positive clzange 
in the level of developriient of the coiintiy ’s Jzunian resources. 
In  terms of participotiori iiz ptimary educntion, primury school enrollment increaseil fio ni 
859, O00 in I974 to 2,855.S46 in 19S9. Although this groivtli (S.3%) had been quite substantial, 
there is still a long way to gop to achieve tlie objectives of rrnive~saliziiig priiiiag) education in 
Ethiopia. 
During 1974-19S9. junior secondary school eizroli?ieiit rose fi.0171 101,749 to 434,684 
increasing at an  aiinrtal rate of 10%. Eiirolment figures in senior secondary schools ìiicreued 
fioi?i 81,296 iìz 1974 to 412,571 in 19S9. 
The country J i a s  16 governniental and noit governmental technical and vocational 
scliools trainiìig middle leiye1 nianportw it1 vocatiorinl fields rvirli nii aiinunl iiitake limited to 
1500. Total enrolment at tertiaty level education liad reached 17,613 in 19S9. 
As it is tlie case for priinav edrrcatioii, secotidaty edrrcatioiz opportunities liave Iiot been 
equitably distributed. The nrrrnber of female stridents m percentuge of the uiales was 69% in 
junior and 64% in senior secondary scliools 1939. Compared \iitJi the 68% rate for Sub- 
Salic~rati Africu, there are still wide gaps to be narrowed. 
A t  all levels of education, there is problem of quality and relevance and uneinployi?ierzt 
especially at vocational level. 
Humari resource developi?ient in Ethiopia is considered to vety low. The various 
fundaniental problenis and ueciknesses of educational development: low coverage, poor quality, 
inequitable distribution ana! the inefficiency of the qstein, all indicate to the low level of HRD. 
In  light of tlie econoniic crises of the county, these problenis can only be solved through 
lorig-ten?i, sustained efforts. 
The Commercial Road Transport Sector: 
Performance, Problems and Future Possibilities 
B a p  M u h t  
Ministry of Planning 
I .  The Etliiopiczii tinnsport q s t e i ~  is poorly developed aiid despite great poteritiuls, its 
coritiibution to the GDP is only 6%. The sector tim been inadequate to support an efficient 
pi-oduction and distribution system. 
2. The cornniercial road trairspoit sector coi?ipiises passenger (urban taxi and bus 
seivices) and freight (diy arid liquid cargo) traizspoif seivices rerzdei-ed by the two parastatal 
orgairizatioiis, the Public TraiispoiT Corporutioii (PTC) and Freight Transport Corporcctioiis. 
3. Coizsideration of tlie status of bus service iii Addis shows that about 12% of all daily 
trips is Iiaiiciled by buses. Iri ternis of the adequacy aiid availability of the service, the Ada’is 
Ababa’s sitrratioii was found to be tlie lowest compared to other African cities with similar 
populutioiz. 
4. Taxi sewice in Addis Ababa is organized in zonal system of operation whereby t a i s  
Ure required to operate ori assigned routes and ut a f ì e d  tariff I n  I98.5, I O %  of all daily trips 
in the city was h i d l e d  by tavis. Tlie old use of tuxis, is ari important aspect of the senice. I t  
was found out that over 7.5% of the tusifleet was more than 20 years old. This has made tm i  
riding dangerous. Recent trends suggest soiiie improveinents in the tusi situation. Over I I O0 
iiiinibuses have been imported for taTi business. 
5. The regional bus service is reirdered by goveniinent aiid piivate buses of digererit 
capacities. Currently the priLiate o\viiers (associates) operate over 3120 sinall, medium and big 
buses while the goveniinent deploys S I 6  big buses. The private sector handles 82% of the 
regional passenger transport. 
6. There are a total of 7400 RIT and liquid caqo trucks of various capacities in the 
country. The private sector which OWIS 87% of tlie national fleet handles 70% of the yearly 
perfornied ton k m  The average age of tlie private truck was 26.3 years while that of tlie 
goveimient was 9.5 years. This old age of vehicles, coupled with shortage of spare-parts and 
deliberate policy of coiitrolirig the gro,ttli of tlie private sector lias made tramport shortage a 
perennial problem in the country. 
7. The probleiizs observable in the conmercial road transport sector emanated mainly 
from the wrong sectoral development strategy. Tlie objective of increasing the role of the state 
sector 11as not been successful. But this objective siicceeded in limiting the growth of the private 
sector. Governmejit policies like ìniport poliq,  tan8 and tax policy reinforce each other in the 
effort of controlling the developnierit of the private sector. As a result, the transport service 
deteriorated. Another problem area is the lack of integrated subsectoral approach in the 
transport sector. The critical importance of tlie inter-relations and inter-phases within the 
tradition, intemiediate and niodeni transport subsectors k overlooked. Problem within the 
niodeni sector are always confronted within the perspective of the modenz sector. Tkis approach 
lias also contributed to unjustified investntent and deterioration of transport sewices within the 
inoderii sector. 
Highlight's on the State of Ethiopia's External Trade 
and Growth Implications 
Ghiorghis Tekle 
Department of Economics 
Addis Ababa University 
Trade induced groirjtli in m a q *  developing countries lias not occuired for a nuniber of 
reasons. In  fact where it occurred, it lias been argued that intemational trade lias subjected 
soiiie developing countries to slow rate of growth of their domestic economies. Although 
interiintiorial trade is believed to improve resource allocation and provide benefits to domestic 
producers arid consumers at large, the situation iii countries like Ethiopia has been to the 
contrary where the expected results from intemational trade have not been realized. A1110ng a 
nuinber of factors tlie unstable foreign trade sector, limited exteninl market, coimiodity 
composition and the tenns of trade are major ones to explain tlie poor pefonnance of trade in 
Ethiopia This sliort paper tries to give highlights on the state of extenial trade of tlie Ethiopian 
economy in the context of growth. 
Export Instability and Economic 
Growth in Ethiopia 
Yohannes Ayalew 
)Clinistry of Trade 
This paper assessed some basic facts about the imtabiliy of Ethiopia’s exports; sirigled 
out and deteniiined the magnitudes of export prices and/or quantities to which total aport  
eaniings are very sensitive; aiid discussed the cotitributioiu made by exports to the count9)’s 
econoniic growth in perspective. Some policy sugestions are also outlined based on tlie results 
obtained in tlie study. 
Front the results it is obsenwi that total esport eurnings idiicli are found to llave a 
signifcaiit potential for growtli liuve been highly instable mainly due to sttuctural rihedities in tlie 
export sector and the ecoiioniy ut large. The study furdier concludes that given the current level 
arid sttucture of tlze ecoriotizy, import substitution strategy is an inappropriate policy target. For 
tlze country to attain self-sustained gro\t.tii (SSG) path, the results stress that, tlze etizphasis 
should be toward spot? &ìve and internal drive policies. 
An Overview of 
Ethiopia‘s Planning Experience 
BY 
T e s f q s  A s f w  Andabo 
hlinistry of Planning 
It is over three decades since Ethiopia adopted a planned approach to development. In 
the irmiediate post II World War period,sectoral programnies of varying durations were prepared 
for agriculture, industry, foresir)?, tramport and telpcoi?inzunications, education and water 
resources development. 
An dniiiiistrative tnacliinew for fonnulating plans, called the National Economic 
Council was establislied in 1955. The Council consisted of a planning Board and a Secretariat 
to the Board, specifically charged with the task of drawing up plans. The Executive Coriiniittee 
of the Planning Board was chaired by the Prime Minister and the country ’s First Five Year Plan 
(1957-1961) as well as its Second Five Year Plan (1962-1967) were prepared under thk 
arrangem ent. 
The First citiri Second Five Year Plan period is marked by the restructuring of the state 
rnacliinery to the rieeds of planning. The restructrrring had a positive iinpact on the country's 
econoiizy, since a nuni ber of rnodeni aird cornpetelit irutitutioirs were created or strengthened. 
The Third Five Year Developinent Plan covered the period between 1968- I973 (2nd was 
compiled under the supervisioli of the new& established Minktry of Planning and Development. 
In  general, tlie first two Five Year Plans were conservative as testified by the  low or 
modest levels of investment and growth rate rutgets they set to achieve while the Third Five Year 
Plan was ambitious (a siv per cent GDP gradi rate) in both regards di ich led to the under 
iiiiplei?ientatioiz of the plan. 
Between 1974 and 1975 there ~qas little or no national planning in the country. Starting 
from 1979, six annual Developinerit Campaign Prograi?inies popularly known as Zeniechm 
I' were prepared. The cniiipaigiis had [imiteci and iiwiediate objectives to address urgent 
prob1ems of the times und were usefiil in helping to idenrib the riiajor coistruints of the 
economy. These were' the reculrelit drought, instability in ,ztorld conitiiodity iiiurkets und until 
recently the inteizsified civil war. 
In 1984 the coutitiy's first long-tem plan covering the period 19S4/55-1993/94 war  
launched. The Ten Year Plan targeted a lofì average annual growtli rate of 6.5per cent in real 
GDP. 
The planning process in Ethiopia passes tlirough a series of iterative stuges which 
include:- 
- Tlie preliminary stage; 
- The anu&tical stage; 
- Adjustriients and direcii1:e stage; 
- Plan elaborution stage: 
- Plan adoption stage; nnd 
- Plan iinplementution stuge. 
Tlie current transitional pen'od in Ethiopia entails a change in the role of planning as 
the country is moving towards a tiiarket econoiiiy. Thus, planning is expected to foclls on 
tnacroeconoinic management in such a way that it could effective& influence and harmonize 
micro-economic decisiors \rhich are the domain of tlie market. 
To accelerate its economic growth over the niediuni to long-tem period, Ethiopia faces 
pressing needs to increase domestic and estemal resource mobilization. This is also the rituin 
challerige of planning. Resources are broadly defined here as conipn'sing not just the priniary 
factors of production (land, labour, capital) but also financial resources, entrepreneurial talents, 
in an agerial and adni in istrative capacities. 
The couìztry S success in acliieviiig its resoiuce t?iol)ilizutiotz objectives will therefore, 
d e p e d  iiz Irir-e IiieuSure rrpoii its ability to itiiprove [lie eficieiicy of its resmrce rue. Tlzis 
requires a conducive econorizic policy eizviromieiit and an effective systeiiz of ecoiioriiic 
ilzaizagenient. 
Linkages Between hlacro Planning , 
a n d  Project Planning in Ethiopia 
by Gizaw Molla 
DEPSA ... 
Plarzniizg esperieizces in Ethiopia have showed us that macro plans set out izatioizal 
economic aiid social objectives, ciiid priorities betu!eeiz differelit sectors and regioizs. The 
for~iirrlrztiorz, cimi eluboratioiz of u iiiucro strategy for ecoizoi?iic aiid social udvniiceiTzeiit is n 
prerequisite for a iiieaiiiizgfitl ideiitifcarioii, preparation, appraisal, iniplernentatioiz ana! ex-post 
evaluutioiz of projects. Thus, runriiiig aiz economy like that of Ethiopia necessitates a well- 
integrated aiid properly coordinated dei-elopi?ieiit plan and that projects are one of the iiicijor 
iiistntiizeiits for concretisiiig plans aiid attlzining overall ecoiiomic aiid social priorities. It is, 
tìierefore, iiecessctiy to emphusise the iieed to establish strong linkages between m-ìcro and 
project plaiiniizg t/irorrgh the building- up of riutional capaciy iiz macro planning and project 
preparatioiz/fot7?zatiolz because projects are considered to be as brrildiq blocks of nrrtioiial 
plaizs. 
Fi n a n ci n g G o ver n men t A gr i c u It u r a 1 Ex p e n d i tu re 
in Ethiopia 
Teshome h4ulat 
Department of Economics 
Addis Ababa University 
Agricultural tau refoniis in receiit years have improved tau perj6ormance in Ethiopia. But, 
rapid growth in govenmient agricultural esperzditures and public expenditures generally could not 
be covered by tax and other rion-inflatiorzaty revenues alone. The jystein of deficit $naming 
pursued by the Govemiiieiit izas resulted irz the inanijiestation of the so-called ' I  recurrent cost 
problem ' I  and the ' I  iizonetizatiorz of deficits ': 
A Review of Post-1975 Monetary Policy in Ethiopia 
Berhanie Abebe 
Department of Economics, AAU 
Review of post-1 97.5 nioiietay policy of Ethiopia reveals important features and areas 
of reforms. The selective credit aiid interest rate policy which favoured tlie socialized sector /iris 
liad credit restraining effect, \i*/iich helped to riiaintrrin iizternal stability iiz tfie face of increuseí] 
bank financing of the fiscal deflcit. The inaili conclusioiis of the paper underlines the 
importance of restructiin'lig tlie financial sector in general ancl the credit aiid interest rate policy 
ii.2 particular in a step-wise \i*uy so that tlie reforin would respond to the puce of reform in the 
real sector. 
Investment Promotion and Incentives in Ethiopia 
Tsegay Teklu 
Office of Investment and Joint Ventures 
Afiicaii econoniies are weak and fragile. Cognizant of tite economic and social problem 
of tlie coiitìiieiit, the Heads of State uiid Gor3ernrnents of the OA U coimiitted theinselves to 
biing about economic developinem, as upressed in tlie Lagos Plan of Action. The Lagos Plan 
of Actioiz stipulates the need for collectii*e self-reliance and self sustaining development by 
creating economic integration units at the national, subregional and regional levels, leahiilg to 
tlie establislii?ient of an African Common i2farket and eventually to an d4fncan Econoinic 
Comminity by the year 2000. Pursuaizt to this, the preferential Trade Area for Eastern aiid 
Southem African Countries (PT,-!) KD.Y established in 1952. Ethiopia is a inember of the PTA. 
The Ethiopian economy izas many structural problems, the main one being its 
ovenv1ielrning dependence on the agricultural sector. As a result the courztry faces many 
econoi7iic and social problems. GDP growth rates are not in tandein with population growth 
rates, leading to decliiies in per capita incoiiie. As a result of very low savings rates, investinent 
rates lire also very low, and these low im*esti?ient rates are virtually financed by extenial sources. 
The poor pefoiniunce of tlie productive sectors, inability to generate foreign exchange, ever 
widening budgetary deficits, ever widening balarice of pryments deficits; exchange rate problenzs, 
the mislirooining of speculative trading activities etc. have brought about penury to the v a t  
majority of people. The low level of development of the county lias been further exacerbated 
by a inis-guided socio-economic policy, interna1 amied coriflict and recurrent drought. 
Tlie Ecoizoiizic Refotni Progrumim declared iri h4urcli 1990 did riot niri full cycling wlieir 
it wm overtaken by tlie cllange in Governiiient. 
The objectives of the investiiieiit legislation issued following tlie declaration of the ERP) 
are the transfer, adoption and absorptioii of rzeeded foreign technology; tlie inobilization of the 
countìy 's material and h i n a n  resources; the generation and/or saving of foreign exchange; and 
bringing about iiitersectoral and inter-regiolial linkages. The iiivesti?ient legislation provides a 
range of ince?itives and a set of guarantees. Soiiie joint venture projects and a few other projects 
liave been approved since the establisliiiicnt of the Office of Iìzvestiiients and Joint Ventures 
(OIJV) iii July) 1990. Tlie OIJV liris rriidertakeii ceiiuin investiiieizt proiiiotioii uctivities by iz*ciJQ 
of publishing iizvestiizent guidelitzes, broclzures, workshops, promotional visits etc. 
There are many probleiiis which have been eiicountered. Soiiie of theni iizclude 
speculutive tradiiig activities; over-valuation of the local currency; inability to nzobilize saviiigs; 
apathy of the bureartcrucy; prohibitive iiiiport dirties; surtíues and other changes of equivalent 
effect, prohibitive iiiaigiiial tca rates; the ì?zargiiiulization of the privute sector etc. wirich ìizade 
investiiieiits in tutigible projects veiy difficult. 
By 1 z q  of recoriiì7ieiidntioiis: there is a iieed for image-building of the coirnttyv; 
rationalizing direct aiid iiidirect tax structures to prorizote savings and investrizeìm; encouruging 
and supporting the privute sector to p l m ~  bzlider pai?icipatory roles in investnieiits; aiid finally the 
ecoiioiiiic policy to be prtrsued sliorild be perinissive eiiorrgli for the uizrestricted nzobilization of 
tlie enonnous liunzari and riiateiial resources of the country by streariiliiiing and rationalizing 
the legal and procedural modus o-uerandi. 
,, ' , 
The Economic Reform Programme in Ethiopia 
Mekonnen Abraham 
Ministry of Planning 
Despite efforts to increme the productive capacity of the econonzy, most of the ecoizoìiiic 
indicators point, to a worsening situation. Per capita irzconze lias fallen, agregute output 
stagnated, savings and investment rates declined, food supply shortages worsened, severe balance 
of payments probleiiz aiid high debt service obligatioizr eiiietged, overt and convert 
unenzployinent probleiizs aggravated. 
I I I  order to tízckle tliese probleim, the p a t  regime took flir reacliiiig i?ic'cLsims in order 
to chaiige the iiistitritiotial frainework uitliin which the ecoiroiizy J i u  (leeli operatitig. The 
iiieasures were designed to mitigate the growirig ecorioinic probleim and place the ecoiiorny on 
the path of recovery aiid sristniried growth. 
The Ecoizoniic Refonn Prograimie (ERP) introduced iii I990 brought new perspectives 
oli the problems aiid prospects of the Etliiopiari ecoizoniy and traiisfonned tlieni into a 
fuiidai?ientally riew overall developmeiit strategy, policies and iiutitutioiial fraineworks 012 miyeíì 
ecoizoiny model. 
Key eleinents of the N E W  are: proniotioii of mixed ecoiioniy where all forins of 
owiersliip - state, private aiid cooperatives - operate side by side oli the bcuis of competitivetiess 
aiid projïfability; greater use of the iiiarket i?iecliatiistu to guide economic decisions; eliniiiiatioii 
of state coiitrols oli the operatioti of private enterprises; restructuritzg aiid divestiture of public 
enterprises aiid eli courageni eiit of forrigti iti vestm èlit. 
The process of implel?ietitiiig ERP IVCIS overtaketi hy the charigc of Goverizi?ietit, wlzich 
brorigli t with it cli unges iii political, it istitutioli (il ut id eco! i om ic eti viroii 171 eli t. 
The o\~erull clspecis of Draft Ecotioniic Policy (DEP) iiztrodrtced by the Tratisitioizal 
Govei-mierit by aizd large siigest that DEP is jiot sigtiifcaiitly differetit flot72 ERP. 
Followirig the adoptioli of ERP the past regime issued a series of proclatnatiotzs niid 
regdatiotis that created the legal frniiiework for itzvestimxt. These regulatioris reinoved 
itivestmetit ceilirigs ou privnte cíipital, eliuiiiiíited coiitrol o11 aren of operation, provided secutity 
of lurid teiiure aiid properr\? owiiersliip iricludiiig the right to tratzsfer, sell, rent, etc und 
elii?iiiiuted labor li inrig restrictioizs. 
AIthorrgli Ethiopia faces r i  Iirtr?iber of probletlis associnted riith bacLwnrdness, the 
potential for developnierit is ii?ii?ietzse. The liberalizarioti policy would help create citi etiablirig 
erivirortmetit for ilirwtors proi'ided these new policy orieiitatiotzs are íiiticulnted iiito pidelities 
aiid directives iii order to eiiiiaiice their upplicutioii in the various spheres of developmem. 
1 J 
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THE MARCH 5,1990 REFORMS 
(extracted form : "A view on Ethiopia or the Ethiopian verses 
by M-P. Verlaeten, DIAL, june 1991, pp. 20-22) 
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III - TKE ETHIOPIAN REFORMS 
31. Under pressure from western governments unwilling to contemplate another famine (para 
6) on their domestic television screens and hoping to benefit from increased western financial support 
the Ethiopian government opened up to economic, social and political reforms at the beginning of 
1990. At the 11th Regular Plenum of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Ethiopia on 
March 5th President Mengitsu Haile-Mariam announced a completely new Ethiopian economic 
system based on a mixed econmy . In addition the President's speech included political innovations 
through which to embody an Ethiopian perestroilha or so called it. 
32. The mixed economy was defined by several points amongst which the most relevant were: 
1/ Tbr: CO - x  e i m e  of s t a t e v a t e  enterprrsesfau3ns to construct a socialist Ethiopia. In 
both cases the latter ones should be encouraged and strenghened ; 
I 41 D e  abol ition of the producers coop Grati V es if this would be the d m c r a  tic will of the 
"bers; 
to 6/ Tbe pea-ts I '  to hire workers to work on thcir farms : the pri vate in vestors r m
establ-s : the pri vate traders I '  riph ts to Co". te without anv restr ictions with the 
I '  
. .  - rade enterprises in all sectors of the economy. 
The six points should lead to a change in the national plans. Instead of issuing state's directives they 
should be transformed into indicative plans reflecting both planning and marketing laws. One of the 
govemment's objectives was to stimule the agricultural sector. As such the reform was more or less a 
. .  onse to a recoí"  amiculture c m .  
. .  33. The Ethiopian perestroilha was prepared since the b e g m u g  of 1988 i.e. in the context of 
the IDA supported Peasant Agricultural Development Project, the Ninth Plenum of the Central 
Committee of the Worker's Party of Ethiopia and the july 1989 three decrees. They were promulgated 
to liberalize the economy improve the climate for private investment and encourage levels of external 
assis tance (24). 
24 The notes of the next paragraphs are fro111 371e Poliq Framework Paper (19Wl91 - 1992193) prepared by the Ethwpian 
authorities in collaboration with the Staffs of the Aid and the World Bank ( a q .  30, 1990). 
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34. The Ethiopian perestroilha was just one comerpiece of a wider Government's Economic 
Reform Programme (ERP) covering the period through the year 2000. Its major aims were : 
a) to raise the real GDP growth rate on a sustained basis in order to progressively increase per capita 
income and consumption ; 
b) to increase food production and food security ; 
c) to diversify the production base ; 
d) to increase exports through broadly based external sector policies ; 
e) to promote balanced regional development in order to expand employment opportunities in both 
urban and rural areas ; 
f )  to provide adequate levels of health education, and other social welfare facilities ; 
g) to introduce and diffuse appropriate technologies in order to raise labor productivity ; 
h) to work toward removing long-term structural impediments to economic stability with a sustained 
high rate of growth ; 
i) to remove or minimize constraints to the quality of life, including the adverse effects of recurrent 
drought, high population growth, and environmental degradation. Vulnerable groups are to be 
protected during this transformation. 
35. To ensure the success of the reforms already announced as well as that of the institutional 
reforms envisagcd in the ERP, the Ethiopian government announced the implementation of 
comprehensive macroeconomic policies and structural adjustment measures during the next three 
years (1991-92). Amongst the latter ones : 
(a) to adopt an appropriate exchange rate level in conjunction with decreased trade and 
exchange restrictions@5); 
(b) to phase out the remaining price distortions by eliminating most official price controls 
while allowing a flexible administration of the remaining controlled prices ; 
(c) to reduce the budget deficit through revenue measures that seek to broaden the tax base by 
removing price distortions and improving the elasticity of the tax system, and through expenditure 
restraint by containing the wage bill, curtailing subsidies, gradually reducing security-related outlays, 
and setting priorities for capital expenditure ; 
25 Exchange rnfeparìty had been fvred to 207 birrper US $ since/ebniary 1973. 
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(d) to pursue a monetary policy consistent with the reduction in the rate of 
inflation by curtailing the Government's recourse to the banking system, while 
providing adequate credit to the expanding private sector, and adoption of a 
nondiscriminatory interest rate structure that is positive in real terms. 
These measures and policies were expected to result in an average real GDP 
growth of about 4.5 per cent per annum during 1990/91 - 1992/93. This rate was 
mainly determined by the agricultural sector which would continue to be the 
leading sector in the economy. 
36. The successful implementation of the reforms was crucially dependent 
on containing the civil war and receiving increased financial support from the 
international community through increased levels of external resource on 
concessional terms and substantial debt relief. This was not the case as far as the 
civil war was concerned. So even the period was too short to appreciate the 
outcome of the announced reforms on people's life it may be said that Ethiopia has 
begun a transition from a command economy to a market-based one since the 
beginning of 1988. 
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